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ABSTRACT 
Executive Compensation and Corporate acquisitions in China 
Mei Xue 
 
This paper examines 259 completed merger and acquisition (M&A) deals undertaken 
by Chinese firms listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2005 
and 2010. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data, augmented by unique data 
on executive compensation, we attempt to investigate how executive compensation relates 
to corporate acquisition decisions in acquiring firms in China. We find that the acquiring 
firms gain significantly positive abnormal returns around the announcement of M&As. We 
also find that the stock price of acquiring firms following acquisition announcements 
statistically outperforms the average market return over a three year period. The salary in 
cash of the top-three executives differs greatly across the acquiring firms. The overall 
level of managerial ownership in the acquiring firms is low. There are some observable 
patterns in the relations between the short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
the acquiring firms and the executive salary and/or ownership. While the level of 
executive ownership has no statistically significant influence on the CARs, executive 
salary is significantly negatively related to the CARs of the acquiring firms, particularly 
those in the higher salary sample. 
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Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisitions in China 
 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been playing an important role in the 
creation of shareholder wealth. As significant and long-term investments a company 
makes, M&A activities provide a unique insight into how managers make investment 
decisions strategically to create firm value. Meanwhile, M&A activities have the 
potential to exacerbate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. M&As 
are thus hotly debated research topics in studies of relation between managers’ personal 
incentives and their investment decisions. 
For a long time M&A activity remained primarily limited to developed markets 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom; however, they are now taking place in 
countries all over the world including several emerging markets. In the U.S., M&As 
continue to take place over time either on a small scale or periodically on great 
magnitude.  Six waves of M&As have been identified, with the first one in the early 
1900s and the latest ending in 2008.  Understandably, major M&A theories and empirical 
studies are largely based on M&A activities in developed markets. In recent years, 
however, the number of M&A activities has risen dramatically in developing countries 
such as China, India, Russia and South Africa. Not only as investment targets of 
developed markets, these emerging economies continue to experience large and intensely 
aggressive M&As domestically and abroad as bidders. Meanwhile, M&As of emerging 
markets have been the subject of intense research interest, allowing the classical theories 
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of M&As to be re-analyzed and tested in quite different contexts. In our paper, we study 
how managerial decisions on M&As are affected by managerial compensation structure 
and ownership and the consequent impact on shareholder wealth in Chinese market. 
The Chinese M&A market has emerged in the last two decades and China has 
been experiencing a spate of M&A activity especially since 2005.  The deregulation of 
the financial services sector and the development of new financial markets, particularly 
the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accelerated the growth of Chinese 
M&A market in the last ten years. Compared with its counterparts in developed 
countries, China has quite different and unique economic environment. SOEs have been 
the dominant form of Chinese enterprise for a long time. During the past two decades, 
SOEs were transformed significantly along with transition of Chinese economy from a 
planned to a market-oriented one.  One result of this transformation has been the 
progressive increase in the listing of SOEs on the stock exchanges.  By the end of 2007, 
more than 75% of the listed firms on the two thriving stock exchanges in China, Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, were SOEs.  In recent years, more and more Chinese 
SOEs have gone public and transformed into modern shareholding firms through M&As. 
The large-scale involvement of SOEs in M&As has in a way created an M&A explosion 
in China.  During the financial crisis that hit the world in 2008, the volume of global 
M&A transactions dropped by approximately 30% to US$2.89 trillion. However, the 
volume of Chinese M&A transactions set a record high of US$167 billion, with about 
US$49 billion that involved SOEs. According to National Statistics, the Chinese 
economy was the most prominent among high-growth international economic entities in 
2008 due to the involvement in the M&A market.  
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Since the economic environment in China differs greatly from developed 
countries, the motives, characteristics and wealth effects of M&As in the Chinese market 
would be different from those in developed markets. A better understanding of M&A 
activities in China is necessary for the fast growing financial market. We focus our study 
on the efficiency of managerial M&A decisions in Chinese contexts. Although managers 
as agents for shareholders are perceived to make decisions in line with shareholder 
wealth maximization, managers could make decisions which diverge from the interest of 
shareholders to maximize managers’ own utility. Executive compensation could be 
designed to give incentives for managers to pursue the interests of shareholders.  Previous 
studies on pay-performance link suggest that incentive compensation helps in aligning 
the interests of managers with those of shareholders.  Managers tend to make decisions 
effectively and improve firm performance with compensation packages of high pay-
performance sensitivity. While most academic work on executive compensation has been 
concentrated on a few developed countries, there is an increasing need to study how firms 
in developing countries, especially with transition economies, compensate their 
executives to provide efficient managerial incentives. 
Executive compensation mechanism in Chinese firms has evolved in the past two 
decades. The “yearly salary system” since 1992 allows wage budget to be linked to firms’ 
economic performance, introducing profit-oriented incentives to employees.  Executives' 
compensation in the “yearly salary system” consists of two parts: a fixed component 
(base salary) that is paid monthly and depends on both the average wage for ordinary 
employees and firm size; and, a variable component (risk salary) that is paid at the end of 
a year and linked to firm performance in the year. The “yearly salary system”, which is 
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like a typical cash compensation package in Western firms, is considered as a key 
incentive mechanism for top management in Chinese firms. Moreover, Chinese listed 
firms were allowed to adopt stock option incentives in September 2006. Equity-based 
compensation began to serve as long-term incentives for managers in Chinese listed 
firms. By 2010, approximately 250 of 1725 listed Chinese firms offered stock option 
incentives.  Although stock option incentives are not widespread in China, stock options 
are a common form of incentive and an important part of executive compensation in 
high-tech companies. In general, cash compensation appears to be the most dominant 
form of executive compensation while equity-based compensation may weight differently 
in Chinese listed firms. The unique ownership structure and compensation system have 
important effects on pay-performance link in Chinese firms. 
In our paper, we explore how executive compensation is related to managerial 
M&A decisions and post-acquisition performance in Chinese acquiring firms on the 
premise that incentive compensation could align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. Moreover, we examine how such a relation is influenced by various 
characteristics of firms and M&A transactions. We limit our study to acquiring firms 
listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges for the period from 2005 to 2010. 
We classify the acquiring firms into subgroups by their size, industry and ownership 
structure; we also classify the M&A transactions by method of payment and industry 
relatedness. We then examine the short-term and long-term stock performance of the 
acquiring firms around and after M&As. We undertake cross-sectional analysis to 
investigate the link between post-acquisition performance and executive compensation in 
the acquiring firms. 
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This paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the methodology and dataset. Section 4 provides the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Theories of Mergers and Acquisitions 
There is a wealth of literature on the relevance of M&A activities. A sizeable 
stream of research investigates the possible motives for firms to engage in M&A 
activities. The theories dealing with value-maximization motivation suggest that M&A 
strategy, like any other investment decisions, should be in line with shareholder wealth 
maximization.  Acquiring firms would engage in M&A activity when the added value by 
an acquisition exceeds the cost of the acquisition.  Likewise, target firms would engage in 
M&A activities with the expectation of gains to shareholders. Positive gains to both 
acquiring firms and target firms arise from synergy. The total market values of the two 
firms after M&As is larger than that prior to M&As. Chatterjee (1986) summarizes the 
possible sources for the value creation and identifies three kinds of synergy values: 
operational synergy, financial synergy and collusive synergy. 
However, plenty of theories and evidence suggests that M&A strategy usually 
lead to non-value-maximizing investment decisions. According to Roll (1986), 
managerial hubris could lead to over optimism in evaluating M&A opportunities and thus 
non-value-maximizing M&A decisions. With excessive self-confidence, managers of 
acquiring firms would offer higher valuation of the target than the true valuation of the 
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target. As a result, the net gains of the combined firms are zero since the positive gains to 
target firms are offset by the negative gains to acquiring firms. Roll (1986) suggests that 
the hubris hypothesis provides an explanation for the occurrence of non-positive gain 
M&As documented by a number of empirical studies.  
Like other agency problems, due to the separation of ownership and control, 
managers may pursue their self-interest at the expense of shareholders’ welfare in M&A 
cases. Managerial self-interest can lead to the outcomes of M&A transactions that 
maximize managers’ utility instead of shareholders’ value. As Jensen (1986,1988) 
indicates, managers of firms with large free cash flows may invest the free cash in 
unprofitable projects such as acquisitions with no benefits rather than pay out dividends 
to shareholders.  On the other hand, Weston, Siu, and Johnson (2001) suggest that risk 
averse managers are likely to undertake M&As to reduce employment and earnings risk 
even if the M&A transaction harms shareholders. Understandably, managerial motives 
would be important determinant for the outcomes of M&A transactions (Zalewski, 2001). 
 
2.2  Empirical Studies: Evidence on Post-acquisition Performance 
M&A activities typically cause significant stock price changes when they are 
announced.  A number of empirical studies on the financial effects of M&As have 
focused on stock returns of acquiring firms and target firms around the announcements of 
M&A transactions. While most empirical evidence suggests that target firms experience 
positive abnormal returns around the announcements, the returns to acquiring firms are 
more complex.  Bradley et al. (1988) find significant positive abnormal returns of 0.97% 
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to acquiring firms using a U.S. sample of 161 tender offers between 1963-1984. Asquith 
(1983) split a sample 169 tender offers into successful and unsuccessful acquirers and 
find that successful acquirers earn significant positive abnormal returns of 3.48% and 
unsuccessful acquirers have insignificant positive abnormal returns of 0.7%, respectively. 
Moeller et al. (2004) examine a much larger sample of 12,023 acquisitions from 1980 to 
2001 and report an equally-weighted abnormal announcement return of 1.1%. They also 
find that the abnormal announcement return of large acquiring firms is roughly 2% higher 
than that of small acquiring firms, suggesting a size effect in acquisition announcement 
returns.  Masulis et al. (2007) examine a sample of 3,333 completed acquisitions between 
1990 and 2003 and find that the mean CAR over a five-day event window (-2, +2) is 
0.215%, significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, the mean CAR is 
negative for transactions financed with stock although the mean CAR for transactions 
financed exclusively with cash is significantly positive, about 0.798%.  
On the contrary, there are several studies that report zero or negative abnormal 
returns for acquiring firms.  For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find evidence of 
zero abnormal returns to acquirers, on average. More recently, Bruner (2002) supported 
this finding using a sample of 130 acquisitions in the 1971-2001 period, showing that 
abnormal announcement returns of acquiring firms is around zero.  Using a sample of 
399 U.S. takeovers from 1975 to 1984, Franks et al. (1991) find an insignificant negative 
return of -1.02% for acquiring firms.  Similarly, Mulherin and Boone (2000) examine 138 
U.S. acquiring firms in a period from 1990 to 1999 and report negative returns of -0.37%. 
Kuiper et al. (2002) examine 181 U.S. acquiring firms for a period from 1981 to 1991 
and report negative returns of -0.92%. 
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Several studies also examine the long-term post-acquisition stock returns of 
acquiring firms, with mixed findings. For example, Haugen and Udell (1972) report 
positive abnormal returns over a four-year period after acquisitions when examining US 
mergers consummated in the period 1961 to 1967. Moreover, they find that acquiring 
firms earn higher returns when the targets are in unrelated industries. Eckbo (1986) also 
finds positive one-year cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and suggest that 
firms acquiring diversifying targets outperform those acquiring industry-related targets. 
However, Agrawal et al. (1992) examine 765 mergers between NYSE acquirers and 
NYSE/AMEX targets over the period 1955 to 1987 and report significant negative five-
year CAARs of about -10%, controlling for firm size and beta. Using 947 U.S. 
acquisitions during a period from 1970 to 1989, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find a 
statistically significant loss of -15.9% over a five-year period after acquisitions, 
controlling for firm size and book to market ratio. Meanwhile, they find that acquirers 
with M&A deals financed exclusively by cash earn significant positive excess returns of 
61.7%, while those with M&As deals financed by stock earn significant negative excess 
returns of -25%. In the UK cases, Gregory and McCorriston (2005) report a significant 
abnormal return of −9.36% and −27% for acquiring firms in three years and five years 
after the announcements.  Alexandridis et al. (2006) examine 179 UK takeovers between 
1993 and 1998 using both the three-factor Fama and French model and the traditional 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and find a three year abnormal return of about -1%. 
Evidence on the accounting performance after M&As tend to be inconclusive 
since it is hard to choose proper performance measures or proper benchmarks to compare. 
Meeks (1977) examines the post-acquisition accounting performance of 233 UK 
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acquirers in 1964-1972 and finds that profitability of acquiring firms increases in the year 
of M&As but decreases in the following five years. Using 2941 UK acquisitions in 1948-
1977, Dickerson et al. (1997) find that acquiring firms’ earnings are significantly lower 
than their earnings prior to the acquisitions and as well lower than the earnings of non-
acquirers. Healy et al. (1992) examine the post-acquisition operating performance of the 
largest 50 U.S. mergers in the 1979-1984 periods and suggest that acquiring firms have 
higher operating cash flows after mergers than industry benchmarks. Similarly, Andrade 
et al. (2001) examine about 2000 U.S. mergers between 1973-1998 and find that the 
operating margins of acquiring firms improve relative to their industry peers. On the 
hand, Lu (2004) shows significant negative industry-adjusted returns on assets and 
returns on equity in acquiring firms during several intervals in the six months after the 
acquisitions by examining 592 U.S. M&A deals between 1978 and 1996. 
 
2.3 Executive Compensation and M&A Decisions 
Literature has paid much attention to how managerial compensation and 
ownership can align actions of managers with the interests of shareholders since Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). As Morck et al. (1988) suggest, firms would increase firm value by 
increasing equity-based executive compensation which reduces managers’ non-value-
maximizing behavior. Jensen and Murphy (1990) indicate that CEOs are given incentive 
compensation mainly through flow compensation (annual salary, bonus, new equity 
grants, and other compensation), changes in the value of stock and options held by CEOs 
and the possibility of a decrease in the market’s assessment of the CEO’s human capital. 
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Hall and Liebman (1998) find that “CEO compensation is highly responsive to firm 
performance” when considering changes in the value of stock and options held by CEOs. 
The widely cited research concerning executive compensation in China by Li (2001) 
examines the pay-performance link in Chinese listed firms and finds that there is no 
significant relation between executive compensation and firm performance, but there is 
significant relation between executive compensation and firm size, industry sector and 
firm location. He suggests that the low level of executive stock and option holdings leads 
to the insensitive pay-performance link in Chinese firms. However, Kato and Long 
(2005) provide evidence on “statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of annual 
cash compensation (salary and bonus) for top executives with respect to shareholder 
value in China by examining Chinese listed firms in 1998-2002. Moreover, they find that 
state ownership of Chinese listed firms weakens the pay-performance link. 
Restricting the analysis to managerial M&A decisions, few studies of M&As 
activities examine the relationship between executive compensation (salary, bonus and 
equity) and post-acquisition performance. Previous studies, for example, Lewellen & 
Rosenfeld (1985) link management ownership in the firm to managerial M&As decisions 
and find that abnormal stock returns from M&As is positively related to the percentage of 
management ownership of the acquiring firms. In a pioneering paper, Datta, Iskandar and 
Raman (2001) examine managers’ equity-based compensation (EBC) and stock price 
performance around and during a three-year period after the acquisition announcements 
using 1,719 US acquisitions in 1993-1998. They report a strong positive relationship 
between EBC and post-acquisition stock performance, controlling acquisition mode, 
means of payment, managerial ownership, and previous option grants. On the other hand, 
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Firth (1991) examines the relationship between executive rewards and M&A deals and 
find executives rewards increase as shareholder value increases after M&As. Bliss and 
Rosen (2001) investigate the relationship between CEO compensation in acquiring firms 
and bank mergers. They find that CEO compensation and wealth increase even if the 
stock price drops after M&As. Using a sample of 327 US M&A deals in 1993-1999, 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that CEO compensation has no significant relationship 
with post-acquisition performance.  
 
2.4 Research on Chinese M&A Market 
Studies and practices of M&A activities in Chinese market are still limited, 
compared with those in developed markets. Boateng et al. (2008) examine 27 Chinese 
cross-border M&A deals taken by firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges in 2000–2004. They report positive and significant CARs of 1.32% over (0, 
+1) period for acquiring firms and suggest that cross-border M&As create value for 
Chinese acquirers in short term. More recently, Chi et al. (2009) examine 1148 M&As on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 1998-2003 using the market model, the 
CAPM model and the buy-and-hold method to calculate abnormal returns. They find 
significant positive abnormal returns in 6 months before and upon the announcements but 
insignificant abnormal returns in 6 months after the announcements. They conclude that 
“M&A does not improve the fundamentals of acquiring firms, at least not in the short-
run.” Moreover, they suggest that higher state ownership has a positive impact on the 
acquiring firms’ performance but pre-acquisition performance of acquiring firms or 
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industry relatedness between acquirers and target firms is less relevant. Meanwhile, most 
empirical results show insignificant operating performance after the M&A 
announcements. By examining sales to asset, return to asset, return to equity and earning 
per share, Feng and Wu (2001) show that the operating performance of acquiring firms 
increases one year after the announcements but decreases in the following years. Wang et 
al. (2001) examine sales’ growth, earnings and returns to equity and show similar results. 
This suggests that the effects of M&As on the operating performance are not material for 
Chinese acquiring firms. Bhabra and Huang (2003) investigate 437 M&A deals initiated 
by Chinese listed firms and find significant positive abnormal returns to the acquiring 
firms in the short term around the M&A announcements. 
 
3.  Data 
We use Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisition Database to 
collect Chinese M&A data between January 2005 and December 2010. We include 
transactions that are: (1) Chinese domestic bidders listed on Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges; (2) M&A deals are identified as a merger or an acquisition of majority 
interest, or tender offers by SDC; (3) M&A deals are listed as completed with an 
announcement date and effective date in our sample period; and (4) bidders wholly own 
the target (100% of the equity) after the completion of M&A transactions. To keep the 
deals in our sample more homogeneous, we exclude ﬁnancial institutions due to their 
diﬀerences in capitalization and regulation from others. We also exclude the deals where 
the bidders are employees, subsidiary or parent company. We only consider bidders 
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which make an acquisition announcement for a single target on the same date, and thus 
exclude deals in which bidders make more than one acquisition announcement in one 
year to reduce any estimation biases resulting from confounding events.  Furthermore, we 
obtain stock price data of acquiring firms and the market return from the website of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We obtain accounting data of acquiring firms 
as well as compensation data of top executives in acquiring firms from Annual Reports of 
Listed Companies in China and the Statistics Year Book issued by the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We exclude bidders which do not have daily price records at 
least one year before the acquisition announcement; and those which do not have 
accounting data and compensation data at the fiscal year end before the acquisition 
announcement. Finally, we have 259 M&A deals in our full sample.  For each M&A deal 
in our sample, we collect information on the announcement date, the effective date, the 
means of payment and the value of the transaction from the SDC. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the 259 M&As completed during the period from 
2005 to 2010 in China.  As shown in Panel A, the number of deals consistently increase 
from 2005 to 2009, with most M&A deals occurring in 2009; 30.12% of the sample. The 
full sample is divided into subgroups by the methods of payment, the relatedness of 
acquiring and target firms, the industry sectors of bidders and the ownership structure of 
bidders, as shown in Panel B. The methods of payment include Cash-only and Non-cash. 
Cash refers to M&As paid with 100 percent cash. Others include those financed with 
equity or assets.  An acquiring firm is considered as related to its target if it is in the same 
industry sector with its target. Otherwise, the acquiring firm is unrelated to its target. 
According to Wind’s industry classification, we categorize the full sample into six 
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industry groups: Financials, Industrials, Information Technology, Mining & Materials, 
Wholesales & Retails, and others. As shown in Panel B, 182 out of the 259 acquiring 
firms, about 70% of the sample, financed their M&A transactions entirely with cash.  The 
data also shows that bidders and their targets are related in more than two-third of the 
M&A deals. In addition, there are more M&A deals in the industry sectors of Wholesales 
& Retails and Mining & Materials, accounting for nearly half of the sample. We 
categorize acquiring firms into SOE and Others by the percentage of government 
ownership. SOE refers to an acquiring firm in which the government ownership is more 
than 50 percent of equity. We observe that SOEs only account for about 15% of the full 
sample and several subsamples. Panel C presents descriptive statistics of deal-specific 
and firm-specific characteristics. Firm size is measured by acquirers' assets; leverage is 
measured by the ratio of debt to equity; average profitability is measured by the mean of 
acquirers' ROA, ROE and profit margin during the three years prior to the M&A 
announcements. We find that the average transaction value of SOEs is twice as high as 
that of Non-SOEs. Moreover, SOEs have much greater firm size, almost four times 
greater than Non-SOEs. Meanwhile, SOEs have higher average profitability and lower 
leverage ratio than Non-SOEs. 
 
4.  Methodology 
4.1. Post-acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms  
4.1.1. Announcement Effects 
Our paper uses standard event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1980) to 
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empirically examine the stock price impact of acquisition announcements. The event 
study measures the impact of M&As on the value of the firm, by using the abnormal 
stock return which is the difference between the actual return and the expected return, 
around the time of an event. The approach is based on the assumption that only the 
random announcement events affect the abnormal returns occurring on that day. Thus, 
abnormal stock returns provide a unique method to measure the impact of an 
announcement on firms’ future expected profitability (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
We estimate the announcement period returns of acquiring firms based on the 
market model. The abnormal stock return on day t is calculated by subtracting the return 
predicted by general market trends on the stock from its actual return on that day, as in 
the following formula: 
                                   
Where, 
  ARit= abnormal return for firm i on day t, 
  Rit= realized return for firm i on day t, 
 
  Rmt = daily value-weighted market return on day t. 
The date of the event is the announcement date of an acquisition, which is 
denoted as t = 0. Following Schwert (1996),  we estimate the market parameters for each 
acquirer firm over a 253 trading day period from day -380  to day -127  (i.e., 
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approximately one year). Then, we calculate the daily abnormal returns of acquiring 
firms over the period from day -42 to day 126. The abnormal returns are averaged across 
all firms on each event day to estimate an average abnormal return (AAR) over the 
period. 
Based on the assumptions that the each day returns are independent and the 
standard errors are cumulative, accumulating the abnormal returns over a given window 
[t1, t2] provides the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm:  
                                      
 
We calculate CARs of acquirer firms over various time windows during a period 
of 42 days before and 126 days after the announcement of an acquisition. The null 
hypothesis is that the mean abnormal stock return during the event windows is equal to 
zero. The statistical significance of CARs is estimated by using the Patell t-statistic 
(Patell (1976)), assuming cross-sectional independence and time-series independence. 
Since t-tests are based on strong assumptions about the underlying return distribution, we 
also perform a nonparametric test, the generalized sign test to ensure the robustness.  
 
4.1.2. Long-term Stock Price Effects 
We measure long-term abnormal stock returns of acquiring firms after M&A 
using the BHAR approach (Barber & Lyon, 1997). BHAR for each acquirer firm is 
measured as the difference in returns on a sample firm and its benchmark through a buy-
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and-hold investment strategy across t days, as the following:  
    (3) 
Where day t = 1 is the first trading day following the effective date, Rit is the return on 
stock i on day t, E(Rit) is the expected return in day t. Here, we use the market index, Rmt, 
as the expected return for each acquirer firm.  
The BHAR approach adequately measures the returns obtained by an investment 
strategy. It interprets whether sample firms earn abnormal returns over a particular 
horizon of analysis. Since distribution of BHRs around firm-specific events is skewed 
over long horizons, we use the bootstrap method to conduct significance tests. 
 
4.1.3. Long-term Accounting Performance 
  We also examine accounting performance of acquiring firms during a three year 
period after M&A announcements to further investigate the long-term effects. Moreover, 
executive bonuses are typically tied to performance measures based on accounting 
information such as ROE or ROA. Executives usually need to meet objectives of some 
accounting returns established by the board, and the accounting returns have impact on 
executive salary and bonus than stock returns (Lambert and Larcker, 1987, 1992). In our 
study, we examine three financial ratios, ROA, ROE and Profit Margin of acquiring firms 
from three years before and three years after the year of M&A announcements. The 
accounting measures deal with the efficiency of management, and thus provide some 
insights into the prudence of managerial M&A decisions. To examine the changes in 
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post-acquisition accounting performance, we estimate the “normal performance” as the 
monthly average ROA, ROE and Profit Margin from four years to one year before the 
announcement year. The abnormal post-acquisition performance is calculated as the 
difference between the actual performance and the estimated normal performance. 
 
4.2 Executive Compensation in Acquiring Firms 
4.2.1. Measures of Executive Compensation 
We measure executive compensation of acquiring firms by considering both 
annual cash compensation and equity-based compensation granted to top three 
executives. All compensation data are recorded at the end of year before the acquisition 
announcement. All value variables of compensation are adjusted for inflation using CPI 
(FY2003=100) and are thus expressed in 2003-constant RMBs. 
4.2.2. Factors Influencing Executive Compensation  
Executive pay levels are determined by a number of factors, such as executive 
skill and effort, firm size and competing firms’ proposed salaries and firm performance. 
Based on our hypothesis, executive compensation can effectively align managerial 
interests with shareholders’ interests and have positive influence on corporate takeover 
decisions. When we examine the influence of executive compensation on acquisition 
performance, we control for a variety of factors that could influence executive pay levels 
to ensure that our results are not biased.   
Firm size controls for differences in executive pay levels between small and large 
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firms. Large firms may offer a higher level of base salary to executives since large firms 
usually have more complex management needs, suggesting a positive relationship 
between firm size and executive pay. Industry classification of a firm may also affect 
executive pay levels. Executive pay in the same industry sector tends to be at the similar 
level, but there are usually industry wage differentials in executive compensation 
probably due to different ability of pay and human capital in different industry sections.  
In addition, a firm’s ownership structure exerts important effects on performance-
contingent executive compensation.  Especially, ownership structure is less endogenous 
in the Chinese context and the introduction of different ownership structure is often 
motivated by political considerations. As mentioned above, state ownership is dominant 
in Chinese listed firms. Listed firms with large percentage of government shares have less 
exposure to the market and thus less market discipline on executives. Comparably, 
privatized listed firms tend to have more effective incentive mechanism. According to a 
survey conducted by Kato and Long (2005), fully privatized firms tend to focus on profit 
and stock performance while SOEs often include factors such as occupational safety and 
health records when they implement the “yearly salary system.” Nevertheless, state 
ownership imply several positive effects on corporate governance. SOEs in China are 
usually superior to private firms in the level of management and the quality of employee, 
and they sometimes signal to the market higher certainty of shareholders’ wealth. 
Although state ownership influence is inconclusive, the link between executive 
compensation and performance varies across firms with different ownership structure. 
Therefore, we take the proportion of state ownership into consideration in examining the 
effects of executive compensation on acquisition performance. 
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4.3. Executive Compensation and Acquisition Abnormal Returns 
Based on the premise that incentive compensation aligns the interests of managers 
with those of shareholders, we examine whether there is a systematic relation between 
executive compensation and abnormal stock returns around and after M&As. We use an 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model to analyze the relation between the CARs 
and executive compensation, controlling for a variety of variables that characterize the 
acquiring firms and the deals. 
 
4.3.1. Firm Characteristics and Acquisition Announcement CARs 
We first consider the effects of firm characteristics including firm size, industry 
classification and ownership structure on CARs around M&As. As Bajaj and Vijh (1995) 
indicate, the market reaction to corporate announcements is larger for small firms than for 
large firms due to less information produced for stocks of small firms before the 
announcements. Specifically, we measure firm size using the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization one month prior to the announcement. Following Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman (2001), we also include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC 
codes to account for possible industry effects. As we mentioned above, Chinese listed 
firms have the ownership structure quite different from their counterparts in Western 
countries. SOEs remain dominant and the state ownership play an important role in the 
listed firms. Moreover, most listed firms have a single dominant shareholder whose 
ownership far exceeds that of the second largest shareholder. Several studies provide 
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evidence that the ownership structure affects firm performance in China. For example, 
Chen et al. (2009) suggest that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies 
varies across the type of controlling shareholder. Central government controlled firms 
perform the best, while privately controlled firms perform worst. Chi et al. (2009) 
examine the ownership of listed acquiring firms in China and find that strong state 
ownership influence on acquiring firms has positive effects on market performance. We 
use a qualitative dummy variable to indicate the proportion of government ownership of 
acquiring firms. 
 
4.3.2. Deal Characteristics and Acquisition Announcement CARs 
Prior research provides evidence on the impacts of deal-related characteristics on 
CARs around acquisition announcements. We also include deal-related control variables 
to capture the difference in M&A transactions. The method of payment (Cash, stock and 
mixed offers) for an acquisition transaction is considered as an indicator of the acquirer’s 
confidence in the value of the deal. Cash offers are perceived positively by the market. In 
deals financed with cash, acquiring firms are more likely to fairly value the targets. 
Acquiring firms which believe that their stocks are undervalued tend to fund takeover by 
cash, debt or abandon the deals. Stock offers may convey negative information that the 
acquiring firms are overvalued (Myers & Majluf, 1984). However, Eckbo et al. (1990) 
suggest that mixed offer captures both signal effects and expected synergy gain 
independent of means of payment and thus offer higher abnormal returns to the acquiring 
firms than the other two payment methods. Travlos (1987) find that acquiring firms using 
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cash offers gained an insignificant cumulative abnormal return of 0.24%, whereas 
acquiring firms using stock offers suffer a significant negative loss of 1.47%. Around the 
M&As announcements. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) support these finding using a larger 
sample of 268 firms, reporting a 0.06% abnormal return to cash offers, -2.74 % abnormal 
return to stock offers and 2.48% abnormal return to mixed offers. Hence, we expect that 
acquiring firms in deals financed with cash out-performance those with all-equity offers 
around and after the acquisition announcements. 
A number of studies investigate the shareholder wealth effects involved in cross-
border M&A transactions, with mixed findings. Some literature suggests that cross-
border M&As enable acquiring firms to obtain valuable and unique resources in the 
outward market and benefit from the integration of diversification and organizational 
capacity (Morck & Yeung, 1992; Barney, 1991; Kang, 1993). On the other hand, the 
complications of cross-border M&A transactions, for example, lack of country and firm 
specific knowledge of the foreign targets, potentially lead to wrong valuation of the 
targets, greater acquisitions costs and bid premiums that lead to zero or negative 
shareholder wealth effects for bidders (Datta & Puia, 1995; Reuer et al., 2004). Currently, 
cross-border M&As are becoming an important strategic tool for corporate growth in 
China. Chinese firms are encouraged to seek investment opportunities abroad, and 
acquiring firms involved in cross-border M&As are provided with prominent capital 
support and resources. A recent study by Boateng et al. (2008) report significant positive 
abnormal returns for Chinese acquiring firms involved in cross-border M&As. Therefore, 
we distinguish between domestic and cross-border M&A transactions to account for the 
deal-related effects on post-acquisition performance. 
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Finally, we consider the effects of relatedness between acquiring firms and their 
targets on abnormal return around and after acquisition announcements. M&A 
transactions in which the acquirer and target firms belong to the same industry are 
classified as a related or focus-oriented strategy, while others are unrelated or 
diversification strategies. Empirical evidence on the shareholder wealth effects of 
relatedness between bidders and targets is inconclusive. Sicherman and Pettway (1992) 
report that the shareholder wealth of acquiring firms increase in focus-oriented deals by 
examining 147 US M&A announcements. On the other hand, Morck et al. (1990) 
examine U.S. deals during the 1975-1987 period and find no significant difference 
between the abnormal return in focus-oriented deals and abnormal return in 
diversification deals. Although diversification might benefit acquiring firms by increasing 
market power and efficiently allocating risk capital in the long term, acquiring firms in 
diversification deals require more information to value targets in unrelated industry and 
suffer from inefficient valuation arising from potential information asymmetry. 
Takeovers in the related industry are assumed to be more efficient and increase average 
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5.  Empirical Results 
In this section, we first present descriptive statistics of executives’ compensation of 
the acquiring firms. Then we examine the short-term stock returns around M&A 
announcements, the long-term trends in the stock performance and accounting 
performance of the acquiring firms after M&A announcements. More importantly, we 
investigate the influence of executive compensation one year before M&A 
announcements on stock performance and accounting performance of the acquiring firms. 
Finally, we undertake cross-sectional regressions analysis for executive compensation 
and for CARs over (-1, 0) and (-1, +1) windows. 
Table 2 presents compensation characteristics of top executives in acquiring firms of 
our sample. Panel A provides information on annual cash income of executives one year 
prior to the M&A announcements and the executives’ ownership at year-end preceding 
the M&A announcements. Cash income of executives includes annual salary, bonus and 
other annual compensation paid to executives in cash. The mean cash income is 280.76 
thousand Yuan and the median is 174.2 thousand Yuan, with the maximum of 2427.42 
thousand Yuan and the minimum of 17.14 thousand Yuan. The level of cash income 
varies greatly across the acquiring firms in our sample. Moreover, it shows that 
executives’ cash income of SOEs is more than that of Non-SOEs, as expected since SOEs 
are larger than the Non-SOEs. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage of equity 
owned by top executives in the acquiring firms. The mean managerial ownership is 4.6% 
and the median is 0. The results show that the overall level of managerial ownership in 
the acquiring firms is low, and more than half of the acquiring firms do not offer their 
executives shares of stock. Obviously, the mean managerial ownership in SOEs, 0.04%,  
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is much smaller than the mean managerial ownership, 5.41%, in Non-SOEs. Panel B 
presents some firm-specific characteristics categorized by executive compensation. The 
acquiring firms are categorized into low/high salary groups as well as low/high 
managerial ownership groups. A firm is categorized in the low salary/managerial 
ownership group if executive salary/ownership is at or below the median, otherwise the 
firm is in the high salary/managerial ownership group. We observe that acquiring firms in 
the low salary group have smaller size, lower leverage and profitability except for profit 
margin than those in the high salary group. Acquiring firms in the low ownership group 
have larger size than those in the high ownership group. The profitability of acquiring 
firms in the low ownership group is slightly lower than that in the high ownership group. 
 
5.1. Abnormal Stock Price Performance Around M&A Announcements 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
within a period of 168 trading days (about eight months), 42 trading days (about two 
months) before and 126 trading days (about half a year) after M&A announcements. 
Overall, there is a positive trend of abnormal returns before and a few days after the 
announcement date. After then, the abnormal returns become negative. Furthermore, we 
observe a positive AAR of 1.47% on day 0, significant at the 0.1% level. Moreover, we 
observe that AARs are significantly positive on day -2 at the 1% confidence level and  on 
day 2 at the 0.1% level. From 3 days prior to M&A announcements to 2 days after, AARs 
are consistently positive, with a sharp price increase on the announcement day.  
Table 3 provides information on the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
  26 
acquiring firms over different event windows during the period (-42, +126). From Panel 
A, we observe a significant positive CAR of 1.76% over the standard (−1, +1) window. 
The CARs in longer windows, for example, (−10, −1), (−21, −1), (−42, −1) and (0, 10) 
also show significant gains at the 0.1% level. Overall, CARs of selected windows during 
the half year after M&A announcements are all positive, but those in longer windows, (0, 
42) and (0, 126) are not statistically significant. CAR over the period (-42, +126) also 
appears positive, significant at the 5% level. 
 Our results suggest that a M&A announcement brings positive effects on stock price 
to acquirers in the Chinese market. A steep increase in acquirers’ stock returns on the 
announcement date suggests significant wealth gains for acquirers from the forthcoming 
M&A transactions. Meanwhile, acquiring firms have already experienced a significant 
price run-up of approximately 2.83% during the 42 trading days prior to M&A 
announcements, suggesting that the M&A activities do not hit the market with a surprise. 
Especially, we observe a positive AAR of 0.68% on day -23, significant at the 0.1% 
level. The stock price increase prior to M&A announcements may be partially related to 
the presence of informed traders or a leakage of information about M&A activities to 
market participants. In sum, it is clear that shareholders of acquiring firms benefit from 
positive wealth effects of M&As in the short term. 
Moreover, we examine the CARs of acquiring firms over different event windows 
during the period (-42, +126) for subsamples categorized by executive compensation and 
ownership. We first partition the full sample into a high/low salary group, and then divide 
each salary group into a high/low ownership category. We examine the difference in 
mean and median of the CARs between the high and low salary group in Panel B, 
  27 
between the high and low ownership group in Panel C and between the high salary-high 
ownership group and the low salary-low ownership group in Panel D. We observe that in 
general, the selected CARs of acquiring firms in the low level group are larger than those 
in the high level group, except for the CARs over (-1, 0). Nevertheless, the difference is 
not statistically significant. Specifically, we observe that the CARs over (-1, 0) is the 
lowest, 0.6032%, in the low salary and low ownership group than those in the other 
groups. However, the CARs over (-1, +1) is the lowest, 1.32%, in the high salary and 
high ownership group. Furthermore, we find that AARs on the announcement day, day 0, 
are higher in the high salary group than in the low salary group and as well higher in the 
high ownership group than in the low ownership group. On the other hand, AARs on day 
-1 and day +1 follow an opposite pattern: they are higher in the low salary/ownership 
group than in the high salary/ownership group.  
 
5.2. Long-term Post-acquisition Stock Price Performance of Acquiring Firms  
In this section, we examine the stock performance of acquiring firms during three 
years after M&A announcements. Table 4 presents the three-year post-acquisition buy-
and-hold returns (BHARs) of acquiring firms, the market index in matched holding 
period and differences between them. Similarly, we categorize the full sample into 
subgroups by executive compensation and ownership. We report the results for the full 
sample, the high/low salary group and the high/low ownership group in Panel A; for the 
low salary-low ownership group, the low salary-high ownership group, the high salary-
low ownership group and the high salary-high ownership group in Panel B. As shown in 
Panel A, the three-year BHARs of acquiring firms is significantly positive, 41.35%, for 
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the full sample. The three-year BHARs for the high/low salary group and the high/low 
ownership group are also positive, significant at 0.01 confidence level. The three-year 
BHARs of acquiring firms in the low salary group is the highest, 55.20%, twice that of 
acquiring firms in the high salary group. Moreover, we observe that the three-year 
BHARs of acquiring firms in the high ownership group is higher than that of acquiring 
firms in the low ownership group, but the difference is not statistically significant. As 
shown in Panel B, the three-year BHARs of acquiring firms in the low salary-high 
ownership group is the highest, 58.69%, while that of acquiring firms in the high salary-
low ownership group is the lowest among the four subgroups. While comparing the 
BHARs of acquiring firms in the low salary-low ownership group with those in the high 
salary- high ownership group, we do not find any significant difference. Overall, we find 
that the acquiring firms in our sample noticeably outperform the average stock market 
over the three years following the M&A announcement. It suggests that shareholders in 
the Chinese acquiring firms have wealth gains in the long term.  Especially, the acquiring 
firms which offer a low level of salary but a high level equity to their executives tend to 
perform best in the long term. It implies that SOEs, whose executives usually have more 
annual cash income but less ownership, do not operate efficiently as non-SOEs. 
 
5.3. Long-term Post-acquisition Accounting Performance of Acquiring Firms  
As defined earlier, the estimation of expected accounting performance is captured 
by the average ROA, ROE and Profit Margin from four years to one year before M&A 
announcements. Thus, we can examine whether actual ROA, ROE and Profit Margin 
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after M&A announcements are significantly different from the expected level. Table 5 
presents the pre- and post-acquisition accounting performance of acquiring firms and the 
difference tests between them for the full sample and subsamples. The second and third 
column of Panel A shows the three-year average accounting performance before and after 
M&A announcements. The average ROA, ROE and Profit Margin after M&A 
announcements are all higher than the expected although the difference is only 
statistically significant for ROA. We report one-year average ROA, ROE and Profit 
Margin during the consecutive three years after M&A announcements. It shows that 
ROA and Profit Margin are significantly higher than the expected in one year after M&A 
announcements. ROE is higher than the expected, significant at 5% level, in the second 
and the third year after M&A announcements. 
  
Panel B and C presents the difference analysis between the pre- and post-
acquisition accounting performance of acquiring firms for subsamples categorized by 
executive compensation and ownership. We observe that post-acquisition ROA and Profit 
Margin significantly outperform those before M&As in the low salary group. In the high 
ownership group, post-acquisition Profit Margin significantly outperforms that before 
M&As. On the other hand, post-acquisition ROA, ROE and Profit Margin are lower than 
those before M&As in the high salary group albeit the difference is not statistically 
significant. There is no significant difference between pre- and post-acquisition ROA, 
ROE and Profit Margin in the low ownership group. While comparing the abnormal 
accounting performance between the high and low salary group, we find that the 
abnormal ROA in the low salary group is significantly higher than that in the high salary 
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group. There is no significant difference of abnormal accounting performance between 
the high and low ownership group. As shown in Panel C, we partition the full sample into 
high/low salary groups and report the comparison of pre- and post-acquisition accounting 
performance for high/low ownership subsamples in each salary group. We observe that 
post-acquisition ROA, ROE and Profit Margin outperform those before M&As in the low 
salary group while the difference is significant except for that of Profit Margin in the high 
ownership group. On the other hand, in the high salary group, all the differences are not 
statistically significant while post-acquisition ROA underperform in each ownership 
group and post-acquisition ROE underperform in the high ownership group. We also 
compare the abnormal accounting performance of acquiring firms in the low salary-low 
ownership group with that of acquiring firms in the high salary-high ownership group. 
We observe that the abnormal ROA and ROE in the low salary-low ownership group are 
significantly higher than those in the high salary-high ownership group.  To sum up, the 
results show significant better post-acquisition ROA and ROE for the low salary group 
and significant better post-acquisition Profit Margin for the low ownership group in the 
low salary group. 
 
5.4. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of CARs 
In this section, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of CARs over (-1, 0) and over 
(-1, +1), respectively, against executive compensation and a variety of variables that 
characterize the M&A deals and the acquiring firms. The regression analysis allows us to 
examine the relation between executive compensation and bidders’ stock performance 
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around M&A announcement, controlling the deal- and firm-specific variables. The 
following three regression models are estimated: 
CARi=a0+a1*logasseti+a2*levi+a3*paymi+a4*diff_indi+a5*ownshipi+a6*ROAi+ 
a7*SOE_dummyi+ei  (4) 
 
CARi=a0+a1*salaryi+a2*levi+a3*paymi+a4*diff_indi+a5*ownshipi+a6*ROAi+ 
a7*SOE_dummyi+ei  (5) 
 
CARi=a0+a1*salaryi/logasseti+a2*levi+a3*paymi+a4*diff_indi+a5*ownshipi+a6*RO
Ai+ a7*SOE_dummyi+ei (6) 
  
Where,  
CARi = Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring firms during the (-1, 0) or (-1, +1) 
event window, 
Logasseti = Natural logarithm of asset size of the acquiring firms at the year-end 
preceding M&A announcements, 
Levi = Debt-to-equtiy ratio of the acquiring firms at the year-end preceding M&A 
announcement, 
ROAi = Return-to-asset of the acquiring firms at the year-end preceding M&A 
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announcement, 
Paymmi = Dummies for the methods of payment for M&A transactions (m = 1: Pay in 
cash only; 0: Others),  
Diff_indni = Dummies for relatedness in industry sectors of bidders and targets (n = 1: 
Bidder and target belong to the same industry; 0: Others), 
SOE_dummyki = SOE dummies (k = 1: SOE; 0: Others), 
Salaryi = Cash income of the top-three executives in the acquiring firms during the year 
prior to M&A announcement, 
Ownshipi = Ownership of the top-three executives in the acquiring firms at the year-end 
preceding M&A announcement, 
Slogasset i = Calculated as dividing Salary by Logasset.   
 
With the three models, we do regression analysis of the CARs for 1) the full sample 
as well as the eight subgroups categorized by executives’ salary and ownership. They are 
2) the high salary group, 3) the low salary group 4) the high ownership group, 5) the low 
ownership group, 6) the high salary and high ownership group, 7) the high salary and low 
ownership group, 8) the low salary and high ownership group, and 9) the low salary and 
low ownership group. We present the results for regressions of CARs over the (-1, 0) and 
(-1, 1) in the nine groups through Panel A to Panel I in Table 6 using each of the models.  
For Model 1, we regress the CARs on executive ownership, controlling the deal- and 
firm-specific variables. We observe that executive ownership does not have significant 
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influence on the CARs over (-1, 0) or (-1, +1) for the full sample and the subsamples.  
For CARs over (-1, 0),  the coefficient of the ownership is negative for all the group 
except for the high salary and low ownership group, as shown in Panel G. For CARs over 
(-1, +1),  the coefficient of the ownership is negative for all the groups except for the low 
ownership group (Panel E) and the high salary and low ownership group (Panel G). 
Specifically, as shown in Panel G, the ownership is positively related to the three day 
CARs, significant at 0.1 confidence level. The results suggest that for the acquiring firms 
in which the executive ownership is relatively low, an increase in the proportion of 
managerial ownership may lead to better stock performance around M&A 
announcements. For the acquiring firms in which the executive ownership is relatively 
high, a higher level of managerial ownership may imply worse stock returns around 
M&A announcements, albeit the negative relationship is not statistically significant. A 
positive relationship between executive ownership and CARs around M&A 
announcement is more likely for acquiring firms with a low level of managerial 
ownership but a high level of salary. 
In addition, we observe that there is noticeable relationship between the method of 
payment and the CARs. The dummy variable, Payment is significantly inversely related 
to the CARs, indicating the acquiring firms in deals financed with 100 percent cash 
experience worse stock performance than the acquiring firms in deals financed partially 
with or without cash around M&A announcements. Contrary to previous research, we 
find that all-cash deals in M&A lead to a significant loss in stock returns of the acquiring 
firms in Chinese market. It seems that the cash offers are not positively perceived by the 
market. On the other hand, as mentioned above, 70% of the acquiring firms in our sample 
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finance their deals entirely with cash. All-cash deals are more common in Chinese market 
and convey less valuable information, per se. Another variable, ROA, shows consistently 
positive relationship with the CARs in all the groups, significant for the full sample and 
the low salary group, suggesting that better accounting performance in the preceding year 
indicates higher stock returns around M&A announcements.  
For Model 2, we regress the CARs on executive salary and ownership, controlling 
the deal- and firm-specific variables. Similarly, we observe that executive ownership 
have no significant influence on the CARs over (-1, 0) or (-1, +1).  As for executive 
salary, we observe a negative relationship between executive salary and the CARs over (-
1, +1) in the high salary group (Panel B) and the high salary-low ownership group (Panel 
G), significant at 0.1 confidence level. In the other groups, there is no significant 
relationship between executive salary and the CARs over (-1, 0) or (-1, +1). Moreover, in 
the low salary-low ownership group, the coefficient of executive salary appears positive 
for the CARs over (-1, +1) (Panel I).  
Once again, it is shown that the method of payment is significantly negatively 
related to the CARs. Meanwhile, it is shown that ROA has a positive effect on the CARs, 
which is significant for the full sample and the low salary group. The dummy variable, 
Diff_ind, identifying the relatedness between bidders and targets, is positively related to 
the CARs of the acquiring firms offering a relatively higher level of executive salary, as 
shown in Panel B, F and G. In the other groups, the coefficient of Diff_ind is negative. 
For model 3, we regress the CARs on executive ownership and the variable, 
Slogasset, defined as dividing executive salary by Logasset, controlling the deal- and 
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firm-specific variables. The results suggest that neither executive ownership nor 
Slogasset has significant effects on the CARs for all the groups. The coefficient of 
Slogasset is positive except in the low salary-low ownership group (Panel I). The 
coefficient of executive ownership is positive in the low ownership (Panel E) and the 
high salary-low ownership group (Panel H), while it is negative in the other groups. 
Furthermore, we do regressions of the CARs over (-1, 0) and (-1, +1) for the SOE 







Ai+ ei (9) 
The models are similar to the previous three models except that we omit the variable, 
SOE_dummy. The results are presented in Table 7. We observe that the executive 
ownership has a positive effect on the CARs over (-1, 0) in the SOE group, as shown in 
Panel A; the executive ownership has an negative effect on the CARs over (-1, 0) in the 
non-SOE group, as shown in Panel B. As for the CARs over (-1, +1), the executive 
ownership has a negative effect in both groups execept CARs for SOE calculated by 
model 3. However, all the relations are not statistically significant. For all the three 
models, the coefficient of executive salary appears negative in both groups. On the other 
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hand, when looking at the results from the model 5, we find that executive salary is 
significantly negatively related to the CARs in the SOE group, as shown in Panel A and 
C. Similarly, there is significant negative relation between the variable, Slogasset, and the 
CARs for SOEs. It suggests that higher payoff to executives does not lead to better firm 
performance in the Chinese government-owned firms.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the effects of Chinese M&As on the acquiring firms’ 
stock and accounting performance and how the acquiring firms’ executive compensation 
can affect the performance using a sample of 259 completed M&A transactions from 
2005 to 2010 in the Chinese market. We observe significant increases in stock returns of 
the acquiring firms around the M&A announcements. As for the long-term post-
acquisition performance of the acquiring firms, we observe significantly positive three-
year BHARs with the market index serving as a benchmark. The accounting performance, 
measured by ROA and ROE, also improves noticeably during a period of three years 
after the M&A announcements. The executive salary and ownership of the acquiring 
firms, on the other hand, have no statistically significant influence on the short-term 
CARs despite some observable patterns in their relation.  
 Consistent with some previous research on the Chinese M&A market (Boateng et 
al., 2008; Chi et al., 2009), we find that M&A deals have positive and significant impacts 
on the short-term acquirers’ CARs around their announcements, suggesting short-term 
wealth gains for the acquirers’ shareholders. The CARs are positively related to the 
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acquirers’ ROA one year before the M&As. The CARs are also significantly related to 
the method of payment for M&A deals. However, in contrast to most Western evidence, 
the acquiring firms financing their M&A deals wholly with cash do not outperform their 
counterparts in the Chinese market.  
 We mainly focus on the executive compensation of the acquiring firms in our 
sample and its effects on the firms’ stock returns around M&A announcements. We 
observe that the proportion of managerial ownership in the acquiring firms is low, and 
more than half of the acquiring firms do not offer their executives shares of stock. 
Meanwhile, the acquiring firms owned by the Chinese government pay a much higher 
level of salary to their executives and have a lower level of managerial ownership. 
 Furthermore, we examine the effects of executive compensation on the CARs 
over (-1, 0) and (-1, +1) in the full sample and the subsample categorized by executive 
salary and ownership. Overall, the level of executive ownership has no significant 
influence on the CARs. Executive salary is significantly negatively related to the CARs 
for the high salary groups and the high salary-low ownership group, but there is no 
significant relation between executive salary and the CARs for the other groups. 
Although not statistically significant, the results imply that an increase in the proportion 
of managerial ownership may lead to better stock performance around M&A 
announcements for the acquiring firms with a low level of managerial ownership but a 
high level of salary. 
 Our study provides evidence on the influence of merger and acquisitions on the 
stock performance and accounting performance of the acquiring firms in the Chinese 
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market. More importantly, we investigate the characteristics of executive compensation 
in the acquiring firms and how executive compensation can affect managerial decisions 
in M&A transactions. Our findings have some implications for improving the efficiency 
of merger and acquisitions. They also indicate a lack of motivation in executive 
compensation in Chinese firms, especially state-owned firms, suggesting a need for a 
more efficient link between executive compensation and firm performance.  
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Table 1: Distribution and Descriptive Statistics of Merges and Acquisitions 
 
The table consists of 259 Merges and Acquisitions completed during the period from 
2005 to 2010 in China. The acquiring firms are listed in the SDC database and have 
executive compensation data in the Chinese Wind's database. The acquiring firms are 
Chinese domestic firms and 100 percent own the target firms after the M&A transactions. 
The full sample is divided into several subgroups by the methods of payment, the 
relatedness of acquiring and target firms, the industry sectors of bidders and the 
ownership structure of bidders. Cash only refers to M&A deals financed with 100 percent 
cash. Non-Cash refers to M&A deals partially or wholly financed with equity. An 
acquiring firm is considered as related to its target if it is in the same industry sector with 
its targets. Otherwise, the acquiring firm is unrelated to its target. SOE refers to an 
acquiring firm government ownership more than 50 percent. The information on 
acquirers' industry sector, ownership structure and accounting data is obtained from the 
Chinese Wind's database. Firm size is measured by acquirers' assets; leverage is 
measured by the ratio of debt to equity; Average profitability is measured by the mean of 
acquirers' ROA, ROE and profit margin during three years prior to the M&A 
announcements 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Merger and Acquisitions by Year (2005-2010) 
Year Number of Acquisitions % of Sample Average Deal Value 
   (in Millions RMB) 
2005 8 3.09 145.22 
2006 25 9.65 389.63 
2007 38 14.67 393.06 
2008 59 22.78 396.55 
2009 78 30.12 400.29 
2010 51 19.69 403.63 
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Panel B: Distribution of Mergers and Acquisitions by Year and Deal Characteristics  
 Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Method of Payment      
Cash-Only 8 17 28 46 50 33 182 
Non-Cash 0 8 10 13 28 18 77 
Total 8 25 38 59 78 51 259 
Industry Relatedness      
Related 5 17 29 38 57 33 179 
Unrelated 3 8 9 21 21 18 80 
Total 8 25 38 59 78 51 259 
Bidders' Industry Sector      
Construction 0 5 10 8 17 3 43 
Industrials 4 6 6 9 12 11 48 
Information 
Technology 
1 2 1 2 4 6 16 
Mining&Materials 1 6 8 18 18 14 65 
Wholesales&Retails 2 6 8 19 18 14 67 
Others 0 0 5 3 9 3 20 
Total 8 25 38 59 78 51 259 
Bidders' Ownership Structure      
SOE 0 3 7 13 11 5 39 
Non-SOE 8 22 31 46 67 46 220 
Total 8 25 38 59 78 51 259 
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Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Deal-Specific and Firm-Specific Characteristics 






Firm Size Leverage 
Average Profitability (%) 
 ROA ROE 
Profit 
Margin 
        
Full Sample 259 1554.1 8463.55 1.59 4.22 8.24 8.65 
        
Cash Only 182 437.63 9782.09 1.86 4.55 8.47 5.59 
Non-Cash 77 4314.27 5347.02 0.96 3.39 7.66 16.48 
        
SOE 39 2024.98 26809.92 1.22 8.22 18.22 11.7 
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Table 2: Compensation Characteristics of Top Executives in Acquiring Firms 
 
The table consists of 259 Merges and Acquisitions completed during the period from 
2005 to 2010 in China. The acquiring firms are listed in the SDC database and have 
executive compensation data in the Chinese Wind's database. Cash Income includes 
annual salary, bonus and other annual compensation paid to executives in cash. Cash 
Income and Managerial Ownership are recorded at the year-end preceding the M&A 
announcements. The full sample is divided into two subsamples by the ownership 
structure of acquiring firms. SOE refers to an acquiring firm government ownership more 
than 50 percent. The acquiring firms are categorized into low/high salary groups as well 
as low/high managerial ownership groups. A firm is categorized in the low 
salary/managerial ownership group if executive salary/ownership is at or below the 
median, otherwise the firm is in the high salary/managerial ownership group. The 
information on acquirers' ownership structure and accounting data is obtained from the 
Chinese Wind's database. Firm size is measured by acquirers' assets; Leverage is 
measured by the ratio of debt to equity (total debt divided by total equity); Average 
profitability is measured by the mean of acquirers' ROA, ROE and profit margin during 
three years prior to the M&A announcements. 




Mean Std. Maximum Minimum Median 
Cash Income(In Thousands RMB) 
    
Full Sample 259 280.76 318.2 2427.42 17.14 174.2 
SOE 39 426.22 547.72 2427.42 38.3 265.12 
Non-SOE 220 254.97 250.59 1615.33 17.14 160.73 
       
Managerial Ownership (%)     
Full Sample 259 4.6 13.72 75.38 0 0 
SOE 39 0.04 0.25 1.54 0 0 
Non-SOE 220 5.41 14.75 75.38 0 0.01 
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Low Salary 2220.09 1.16 2.08 3.76 9.05 
High Salary 14755.42 2.03 6.66 13.31 8.2 
      
Managerial 
Ownership (%) 
   
 
 
      
Low Ownership 11701.53 1.41 3.82 7.61 5.71 
High Ownership 5200.48 1.78 4.6 8.84 11.42 
  52 
Table 3 Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of acquiring firms 
This table presents the CARs of acquiring firms over  18 event windows during a period 
from 42 days prior to and 126 days after M&A announcements for our full sample. We 
estimate the CARs of acquiring firms based on the market model with a 253 trading day 
estimation period from day -380 to day -127 prior to M&A announcements. The 
acquiring firms are categorized into low/high salary groups as well as low/high 
managerial ownership groups. A firm is categorized in the low salary/managerial 
ownership group if executive salary/ownership is at or below the median, otherwise the 
firm is in the high salary/managerial ownership group. We report the CARs for the full 
sample in Panel A; the CARs for low and high salary group in Panel B; the CARs for the 
low and high ownership group in Panel C; and the CARs for the low salary-low 
ownership group and the high salary-high ownership group in Panel D. We also report 

















(-42,-1) 232 2.83% 3.75%  136:96>>> 3.347*** 4.546*** 
(-21,-1) 197 1.73% 2.36%  106:91>> 3.127** 2.827** 
(-10,-1) 183 1.21% 1.51%  87:96 2.903** 1.017 
(-5,-1) 178 0.68% 0.91%  86:92 2.478* 1.211 
(-2,-1) 170 0.52% 0.68%  80:90 2.962** 0.853 
(-1,0) 232 1.47% 0.94%  133:99>>> 3.580*** 4.149*** 
(-1,+1) 235 1.76% 1.26%  133:102>>> 3.997*** 3.950*** 
(-2,+2) 239 2.68% 2.43%  138:101>>> 6.267*** 4.340*** 
(-5,+5) 242 2.52% 2.61%  128:114>> 4.499*** 2.847** 
(-10,+10) 243 3.40% 3.72%  131:112>> 4.694*** 3.172** 
(0,+1) 234 1.75% 1.10%  126:108>> 3.986*** 3.093** 
(0,+2) 236 2.34% 1.75%  131:105>>> 5.526*** 3.621*** 
(0,+5) 238 2.06% 1.70%  124:114>> 3.754*** 2.577** 
(0,+10) 240 2.52% 2.21%  122:118> 3.698*** 2.192* 
(0,+21) 241 2.17% 1.94%  117:124 2.292* 1.482 
(0,+42) 243 1.60% 1.56%  120:123) 1.267 1.750$ 
(0,+126) 244 5.04% 2.14%  125:119> 1.052 2.335* 
(-42,+126) 244 7.73% 5.89%  126:118> 2.420* 2.464* 
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Panel B 






CAR N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Diff_Test 
T 
P-value Diff_Test Z P-value 
(-42,-1) 116 0.0317*** 0.0188 116 0.0248** 0.0398 -0.2913 0.7711 -0.0610 0.9516 
(-21,-1) 102 0.0247** 0.0171 95 0.0093 -0.0066 -0.8582 0.3918 -1.2730 0.2030 
(-10,-1) 95 0.0131* 0.0074 88 0.0110* -0.0084 -0.1559 0.8763 -1.1560 0.2475 
(-5,-1) 91 0.0049 -0.0003 87 0.0087 -0.0009 0.3590 0.7200 0.4030 0.6869 
(-2,-1) 87 0.0029 -0.0058 83 0.0076 0.0012 0.6505 0.5163 0.7560 0.4497 
(-1,0) 120 0.0157*** 0.0070 112 0.0136** 0.0026 -0.2173 0.8282 -0.5210 0.6026 
(-1,+1) 121 0.0160*** 0.0063 114 0.0193*** 0.0014 0.2916 0.7709 -0.3800 0.7038 
(-2,+2) 121 0.0207** 0.0146 118 0.0331*** 0.0059 0.9191 0.3590 0.0060 0.9955 
(-5,+5) 121 0.0217** 0.0075 121 0.0287*** 0.0060 0.3748 0.7082 -0.1220 0.9028 
(-10,+10) 121 0.0212** 0.0079 122 0.0467*** 0.0152 1.1020 0.2716 0.7780 0.4368 
(0,+1) 121 0.0159*** 0.0063 113 0.0191*** 0.0004 0.2939 0.7691 -0.5770 0.5640 
(0,+2) 121 0.0186*** 0.0087 115 0.0285*** 0.0014 0.7629 0.4463 -0.0850 0.9324 
(0,+5) 121 0.0180*** 0.0151 117 0.0232*** -0.0052 0.2882 0.7734 -0.6110 0.5411 
(0,+10) 121 0.0109 -0.0041 119 0.0397*** 0.0058 1.3700 0.1720 1.2130 0.2250 
(0,+21) 121 0.0013 -0.0294 120 0.0422*** 0.0245 1.7074 0.0891 2.1010 0.0356 
(0,+42) 121 -0.0032 -0.0188 122 0.0350 0.0135 1.3003 0.1947 1.2610 0.2072 
(0,+126) 121 -0.0383 -0.0430 123 0.1376 0.0517 1.9273 0.0551 2.0510 0.0403 
(-42,+126) 121 -0.0079 -0.0056 123 0.1610 0.0368 1.7918 0.0744 1.4740 0.1405 
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Panel C 











(-42,-1) 112 0.0172 0.0357 120 0.0386*** 0.0336 0.8957 0.3714 0.1140 0.9096 
(-21,-1) 97 0.0090 0.0129 100 0.0253** 0.0063 0.9042 0.3670 0.4320 0.6654 
(-10,-1) 90 0.0048 -0.0132 93 0.0192** 0.0004 1.0821 0.2807 1.4070 0.1595 
(-5,-1) 87 0.0027 -0.0009 91 0.0106 0.0024 0.7520 0.4530 0.5780 0.5635 
(-2,-1) 83 0.0000 -0.0036 87 0.0102 0.0011 1.4147 0.1590 1.3760 0.1687 
(-1,0) 113 0.0202*** 0.0026 119 0.0094 0.0049 -1.1566 0.2486 -0.1110 0.9120 
(-1,+1) 115 0.0166*** 0.0009 120 0.0186*** 0.0102 0.1778 0.8590 0.9640 0.3352 
(-2,+2) 116 0.0222*** 0.0052 123 0.0312*** 0.0173 0.6695 0.5038 1.0450 0.2962 
(-5,+5) 117 0.0209*** 0.0013 125 0.0292*** 0.0119 0.4426 0.6585 0.5280 0.5973 
(-10,+10) 117 0.0224** 0.0151 126 0.0448*** 0.0070 0.9693 0.3334 0.6430 0.5203 
(0,+1) 115 0.0183*** 0.0038 119 0.0167*** 0.0038 -0.1462 0.8839 0.2420 0.8085 
(0,+2) 116 0.0222*** 0.0074 120 0.0246*** 0.0052 0.1859 0.8527 0.0670 0.9468 
(0,+5) 117 0.0189*** 0.0119 121 0.0221*** 0.0020 0.1787 0.8583 0.0440 0.9647 
(0,+10) 117 0.0187** 0.0058 123 0.0314*** -0.0041 0.6053 0.5456 0.1870 0.8517 
(0,+21) 117 0.0128 -0.0044 124 0.0301** -0.0145 0.7169 0.4741 0.2940 0.7688 
(0,+42) 118 0.0187 0.0123 125 0.0135 -0.0245 -0.1770 0.8597 -0.3270 0.7438 
(0,+126) 118 0.0902*** 0.0440 126 0.0131 -0.0099 -0.8396 0.4020 -0.4540 0.6500 
(-42,+126) 118 0.1066 0.0451 126 0.0498 -0.0117 -0.5983 0.5502 -0.2830 0.7771 
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Panel D 













(-42,-1) 59 0.0443*** 0.0470 63 0.0565*** 0.0409 -0.3493 0.7275 0.0280 0.9775 
(-21,-1) 51 0.0253** 0.0145 49 0.0265** -0.0078 -0.0424 0.9662 -0.6520 0.5147 
(-10,-1) 46 0.0076 0.0023 44 0.0202*** -0.0022 -0.6227 0.5351 0.1610 0.8718 
(-5,-1) 44 0.0025 -0.0003 44 0.0144** 0.0033 -0.7575 0.4508 0.6590 0.5097 
(-2,-1) 42 -0.0008 -0.0044 42 0.0144*** 0.0082 -1.3466 0.1818 1.4760 0.1399 
(-1,0) 60 0.0187*** 0.0034 59 0.0060 0.0016 0.9446 0.3468 -0.4250 0.6707 
(-1,+1) 61 0.0132*** 0.0020 60 0.0183*** 0.0048 -0.3424 0.7326 0.4720 0.6371 
(-2,+2) 61 0.0194*** 0.0146 63 0.0400*** 0.0192 -1.1638 0.2468 0.7920 0.4282 
(-5,+5) 61 0.0285*** 0.0187 65 0.0425*** 0.0234 -0.6028 0.5478 0.3250 0.7455 
(-10,+10) 61 0.0230*** 0.0264 66 0.0679*** 0.0430 -1.4974 0.1368 1.0810 0.2797 
(0,+1) 61 0.0164*** 0.0072 59 0.0179*** 0.0021 -0.1090 0.9134 -0.1860 0.8522 
(0,+2) 61 0.0200*** 0.0138 60 0.0320*** 0.0026 -0.7101 0.4791 0.0570 0.9545 
(0,+5) 61 0.0267*** 0.0198 61 0.0349*** -0.0013 -0.3586 0.7205 -0.3000 0.7645 
(0,+10) 61 0.0172** 0.0245 63 0.0571*** 0.0233 -1.4307 0.1551 1.0470 0.2951 
(0,+21) 61 0.0052 -0.0183 64 0.0607*** 0.0555 -1.7274 0.0866 1.6300 0.1031 
(0,+42) 61 0.0126 0.0168 65 0.0435*** 0.0383 -0.7926 0.4295 0.8080 0.4191 
(0,+126) 61 0.0031 0.0391 66 0.0981*** 0.0713 -1.4284 0.1557 1.0370 0.2995 
(-42,+126) 61 0.0459 0.0628 66 0.1520*** 0.1041 -1.3905 0.1669 0.7380 0.4603 
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Table 4 Three-year BHAR of acquiring firms after M&As 
This table presents three-year BHAR of acquiring firms after M&A announcements. BHAR for each acquirer firm is measured as the 
difference in returns on a sample firm and its benchmark through a buy-and-hold investment strategy. The benchmark here is the 
three-year BHR on the market index. Since distribution of BHRs around firm-specific events is skewed over long horizons, we use the 
bootstrap method to conduct significance tests. The acquiring firms are categorized into low/high salary groups as well as low/high 
managerial ownership groups. We report the results for the full sample, the high/low salary group and the high/low ownership group 
in Panel A; for the for the low salary-low ownership group, the low salary-high ownership group, the high salary-low ownership group 
and the high salary-high ownership group in Panel B. We also report the results of difference tests between the subsamples 











Test of Diff.  








Test of Diff.  
(3) vs. (4) 
(p-value) 
Sample Firms' 3-year 
BHR 0.5477 0.7510 0.3427  0.4677 0.6282  
Matched 3-year BHR 0.1341 0.1990 0.0687  0.1065 0.1620  
Difference 0.4135 0.5520 0.2740 0.0408* 0.3613 0.4662 0.4414 
Test of Diff. (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  
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Panel B        














Test of Diff.  
(1) vs. (4) 
(p-value)  
Sample Firms' 3-year 
BHR 0.7126 0.7932 0.1991 0.4755   
Matched 3-year BHR 0.1924 0.2062 0.0122 0.1210   
Difference 0.5202 0.5869 0.1869 0.3545 0.3924  
Test of Diff. (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.049* 0.000***   
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Table 5 Pre- and post-acquisition accounting performance of acquiring firms and the difference tests 
 
This table presents three accounting performance measures, ROA, ROE and Profit Margin of acquiring firms during three years after 
M&A announcements. ROA is computed as operating profit (EBIT) divided by total assets. ROE is computed as Net Income divided 
by Shareholder’s Equity. Profit Margin is computed as Net Income divided by Revenue. We estimate the “normal performance” as the 
average ROA, ROE and Profit Margin from four years to one year before the announcement year (pre-Mean). We report the difference 
between the “normal performance” and the post-acquisition performance during three years after M&A announcements in Panel A. 
We also report the difference for the subsample categorized as low/high salary groups and low/high managerial ownership groups in 




Pre_Mean Post_Mean +1 +2 +3 
Test of Diff.  
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) vs. (2) (1) vs. (3) (1) vs. (4) (1) vs. (5) 
ROA 0.0422 0.0534 0.0581 0.0487 0.0470 0.0477** 0.0912* 0.1300 0.2135 
          
ROE 0.0824 0.1158 0.1052 0.1195 0.1228 0.5189 0.5156 0.0418** 0.0395** 
          
Profit Margin 0.0865 0.1472 0.2900 0.0313 0.1203 0.3092 0.0886* 0.6444 0.021** 
 







Test of Diff.  






Test of Diff.  
(3) vs. (4) 
(p-value) 
 Pre_Mean 0.0208 0.0666  0.0382 0.0460  
ROA Post_Mean 0.0476 0.0602  0.0478 0.0587  
 Difference 0.0268 -0.0065 0.0031** 0.0097 0.0127 0.7902 
 






        
 Pre_Mean 0.0376 0.1331  0.0761 0.0884  
ROE Post_Mean 0.0753 0.1215  0.1211 0.0741  
 Difference 0.0377 -0.0117 0.2741 0.0449 -0.0143 0.1883 
 






        
Profit 
Margin 
Pre_Mean 0.0905 0.0820  0.0571 0.1142  
Post_Mean 0.2797 0.0201  0.0500 0.2603  
Difference 0.1892 -0.0619 0.0754 -0.0070 0.1460 0.2787 
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Panel C 










Test of Diff.  
(1) vs. (4) 
(p-value) 
 Pre_Mean 0.0187 0.0229 0.0632 0.0695  
ROA Post_Mean 0.0383 0.0572 0.0601 0.0602  
 Difference 0.0196 0.0343 -0.0031 -0.0093 0.0307* 
 
Test of Diff.  
(p-value) 0.0915* 0.0277** 0.7127 0.1321  
       
 Pre_Mean 0.0378 0.0373 0.1255 0.1395  
ROE Post_Mean 0.1098 0.0384 0.1355 0.1098  
 Difference 0.0721 0.0010 0.0100 -0.0297 0.0229* 
 
Test of Diff.  
(p-value) 0.0680* 0.9888 0.6575 0.1251  
       
Profit 
Margin 
Pre_Mean 0.0171 0.1676 0.1084 0.0600  
Post_Mean 0.1707 0.3942 -0.1051 0.1241  
Difference 0.1536 0.2266 -0.2136 0.0641 0.2871 
Test of Diff.  
(p-value) 
0.0353** 0.1526 0.3954 0.1225  
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Table 6 Cross-sectional regression analysis of the CARs over (-1, 0) and (-1, +1)  
for acquiring firms 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions of the CARs for acquiring 
firms using three models. The dependent variable is CARs over (-1, 0) and (-1, +1), 
regressed against executive compensation and ownership, controlling a variety of firm- 
and deal- specific variables including leverage, firm size, ROA, SOE indicator, method of 
payment and relatedness of bidders and targets. The acquiring firms are categorized into 
low/high salary groups as well as low/high managerial ownership groups. We report the 
results for the full sample in Panel A; for the high salary group in Panel B; the low salary 
group in Panel C; for the high ownership group in Panel D; the low ownership group in 
Panel E; for the high salary- high ownership group in Panel F; for the high salary- low 
ownership group in Panel G; for the low salary- high ownership group in Panel H; and for 




Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
_cons 3.881 5.968 6.078  10.294 7.710 7.879  
 (0.229) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)  
leverage -0.312 -0.252 -0.255  -0.453 -0.502 -0.511  
 (0.205) (0.284) (0.278)  (0.112) (0.064) (0.06)  
paym -4.643 -4.403 -4.388  -5.626 -5.501 -5.514  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
diff_ind -1.492 -1.337 -1.342  -1.752 -1.716 -1.750  
 (0.171) (0.218) (0.216)  (0.161) (0.167) (0.159)  
soe_dummy -1.273 -0.819 -0.853  -0.500 -0.443 -0.572  
 (0.403) (0.584) (0.566)  (0.772) (0.794) (0.734)  
roa 0.109 0.126 0.128  0.146 0.144 0.145  
 (0.094) (0.047) (0.045)  (0.052) (0.049) (0.049)  
logasset 0.659    -0.932    
 (0.501)    (0.405)    
salary  -0.112    -0.247   
  (0.489)    (0.184)   
slogasset   -0.575    -1.076  
   (0.443)    (0.212)  
ownership -0.042 -0.048 -0.047  -0.059 -0.053 -0.050  
 (0.309) (0.231) (0.241)  (0.216) (0.257) (0.278)  
N 210 210 210  213 213 213  
R2 0.093 0.093 0.094  0.120 0.125 0.124  
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.062 0.062  0.090 0.095 0.094  
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Panel B HS        
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 8.457 5.308 5.720  15.648 4.629 5.203 
 (0.115) (0.025) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.054) (0.035) 
leverage -0.077 -0.228 -0.271  -0.023 -0.523 -0.589 
 (0.890) (0.656) (0.596)  (0.968) (0.322) (0.267) 
paym -4.078 -3.721 -3.627  -2.915 -2.573 -2.500 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.058)  (0.118) (0.181) (0.198) 
diff_ind 0.765 0.817 0.823  2.721 2.210 2.158 
 (0.662) (0.632) (0.628)  (0.128) (0.210) (0.220) 
roa 0.057 0.053 0.052  0.068 0.026 0.022 
 (0.660) (0.676) (0.682)  (0.607) (0.840) (0.866) 
soe_dummy -0.291 -0.428 -0.614  -0.140 -1.021 -1.341 
 (0.884) (0.824) (0.748)  (0.945) (0.606) (0.497) 
logasset -1.131    -3.763   
 (0.476)    (0.021)   
salary  -0.246    -0.410  
  (0.238)    (0.058)  
slogasset   -1.284    -1.953 
   (0.213)    (0.068) 
ownership -0.038 -0.031 -0.029  -0.068 -0.032 -0.028 
 (0.530) (0.594) (0.618)  (0.268) (0.589) (0.639) 
N 103 103 103  104 104 104 
R2 0.070 0.079 0.080  0.117 0.101 0.099 
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Panel C LS 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
_cons 0.437 8.252 9.077  5.995 11.092 11.489  
 (0.938) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.393) (0.000) (0.000)  
leverage -0.458 -0.353 -0.356  -0.696 -0.627 -0.628  
 (0.094) (0.190) (0.181)  (0.044) (0.064) (0.061)  
paym -4.842 -4.542 -4.653  -7.307 -7.107 -7.159  
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
diff_ind -3.159 -3.233 -3.168  -4.825 -4.846 -4.806  
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.033)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
soe_dummy 0.129 0.161 0.164  0.184 0.204 0.205  
 (0.093) (0.038) (0.032)  (0.057) (0.036) (0.033)  
roa -2.243 -2.008 -2.075  -0.123 -0.080 -0.132  
 (0.385) (0.438) (0.421)  (0.968) (0.979) (0.966)  
logasset 2.230    1.522    
 (0.212)    (0.494)    
salary  -1.129    -0.542   
  (0.520)    (0.801)   
slogasset   -6.019    -2.909  
   (0.275)    (0.667)  
ownership -0.076 -0.083 -0.074  -0.086 -0.091 -0.087  
 (0.200) (0.168) (0.218)  (0.249) (0.222) (0.247)  
N 107 107 107  109 109 109  
R2 0.170 0.160 0.167  0.216 0.213 0.214  
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Panel D HO       
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 6.448 9.138 9.221  12.951 9.964 10.069 
 (0.282) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) 
leverage -0.067 0.024 0.017  -0.087 -0.170 -0.186 
 (0.875) (0.950) (0.966)  (0.853) (0.690) (0.662) 
paym -7.912 -7.744 -7.724  -8.953 -8.794 -8.792 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
diff_ind -2.570 -2.340 -2.329  -3.174 -3.070 -3.091 
 (0.123) (0.167) (0.167)  (0.083) (0.098) (0.094) 
roa 0.113 0.132 0.133  0.198 0.192 0.192 
 (0.211) (0.133) (0.130)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
soe_dummy -3.739 -3.548 -3.518  -1.693 -1.782 -1.744 
 (0.241) (0.264) (0.268)  (0.628) (0.608) (0.616) 
logasset 0.846    -1.048   
 (0.648)    (0.602)   
salary  -0.119    -0.237  
  (0.745)    (0.553)  
slogasset   -0.560    -0.949 
   (0.698)    (0.549) 
ownership -0.056 -0.063 -0.062  -0.060 -0.053 -0.051 
 (0.272) (0.194) (0.199)  (0.281) (0.317) (0.333) 
N 109 109 109  111 111 111 
R2 0.191 0.190 0.191  0.206 0.207 0.207 
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Panel E LO 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 1.909 1.261 1.388  8.219 3.596 3.780 
 (0.556) (0.426) (0.389)  (0.055) (0.090) (0.080) 
leverage -0.742 -0.745 -0.747  -0.852 -0.918 -0.924 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) 
paym 0.692 0.817 0.777  -0.460 -0.644 -0.726 
 (0.624) (0.555) (0.575)  (0.807) (0.728) (0.696) 
diff_ind -0.076 -0.107 -0.141  0.178 -0.002 -0.063 
 (0.953) (0.933) (0.912)  (0.915) (0.999) (0.970) 
roa 0.108 0.114 0.113  0.082 0.066 0.063 
 (0.240) (0.204) (0.210)  (0.504) (0.584) (0.603) 
soe_dummy 0.158 0.387 0.275  0.207 0.036 -0.164 
 (0.918) (0.797) (0.854)  (0.918) (0.985) (0.933) 
logasset -0.289    -1.704   
 (0.766)    (0.185)   
salary  -0.162    -0.267  
  (0.267)    (0.169)  
slogasset   -0.689    -1.070 
   (0.340)    (0.266) 
ownership -202.949 -250.070 -248.761  314.972 163.670 168.305 
 (0.713) (0.646) (0.649)  (0.668) (0.823) (0.818) 
N 101 101 101  102 102 102 
R2 0.107 0.118 0.115  0.105 0.107 0.100 
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Panel F HSHO 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 4.574 8.901 9.188  14.081 5.534 5.719 
 (0.654) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.140) (0.116) (0.117) 
leverage -0.293 -0.135 -0.186  0.181 -0.254 -0.311 
 (0.723) (0.847) (0.792)  (0.812) (0.698) (0.639) 
paym -8.299 -7.570 -7.529  -7.158 -6.670 -6.788 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) 
diff_ind -0.448 0.403 0.367  2.429 2.289 2.085 
 (0.875) (0.887) (0.896)  (0.362) (0.389) (0.428) 
soe_dummy -3.825 -3.999 -3.966  -1.187 -1.601 -1.485 
 (0.314) (0.295) (0.298)  (0.736) (0.652) (0.676) 
roa 0.026 0.047 0.043  0.208 0.176 0.170 
 (0.894) (0.810) (0.825)  (0.260) (0.332) (0.349) 
logasset 1.274    -3.053   
 (0.688)    (0.295)   
salary  -0.294    -0.457  
  (0.576)    (0.353)  
slogasset   -1.251    -1.537 
   (0.558)    (0.441) 
ownership -0.034 -0.053 -0.050  -0.059 -0.036 -0.031 
 (0.652) (0.454) (0.475)  (0.411) (0.582) (0.639) 
N 56 56 56  57 57 57 
R2 0.184 0.187 0.187  0.225 0.222 0.217 
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Panel G HSLO 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 8.996 0.088 0.622  13.202 -1.694 -1.062 
 (0.129) (0.978) (0.846)  (0.053) (0.650) (0.780) 
leverage 0.377 -0.080 -0.129  0.490 -0.299 -0.361 
 (0.664) (0.923) (0.877)  (0.622) (0.761) (0.715) 
paym 2.230 2.591 2.620  5.250 5.576 5.588 
 (0.350) (0.287) (0.285)  (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) 
diff_ind 1.592 1.157 1.118  3.338 2.412 2.347 
 (0.420) (0.551) (0.566)  (0.143) (0.299) (0.315) 
soe_dummy 1.991 1.235 0.902  0.990 -0.419 -0.837 
 (0.353) (0.552) (0.663)  (0.685) (0.865) (0.734) 
roa 0.031 -0.016 -0.016  -0.082 -0.178 -0.179 
 (0.846) (0.917) (0.921)  (0.657) (0.342) (0.343) 
logasset -3.028    -5.006   
 (0.065)    (0.009)   
salary  -0.318    -0.396  
  (0.093)    (0.079)  
slogasset   -1.595    -1.933 
   (0.111)    (0.105) 
ownership 140.979 -79.555 -105.494  1695.886 1412.888 1388.247 
 (0.864) (0.924) (0.900)  (0.077) (0.161) (0.173) 
N 47 47 47  47 47 47 
R2 0.107 0.093 0.087  0.282 0.209 0.200 
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Panel H LSHO 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 13.188 13.822 13.756  21.359 16.739 16.456 
 (0.204) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.095) (0.002) (0.003) 
leverage -0.107 -0.008 -0.039  -0.432 -0.427 -0.460 
 (0.838) (0.987) (0.939)  (0.499) (0.501) (0.464) 
paym -7.076 -7.372 -7.327  -9.286 -9.443 -9.389 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
diff_ind -5.080 -4.430 -4.223  -8.099 -7.272 -7.148 
 (0.035) (0.064) (0.084)  (0.007) (0.015) (0.020) 
soe_dummy -4.507 -3.514 -3.583  -3.682 -2.936 -3.057 
 (0.580) (0.665) (0.659)  (0.712) (0.770) (0.761) 
roa 0.152 0.204 0.196  0.238 0.263 0.252 
 (0.167) (0.091) (0.094)  (0.080) (0.077) (0.080) 
logasset -0.877    -2.358   
 (0.778)    (0.536)   
salary  -3.632    -3.115  
  (0.321)    (0.476)  
slogasset   -11.733    -9.271 
   (0.327)    (0.517) 
ownership -0.110 -0.090 -0.080  -0.122 -0.095 -0.088 
 (0.153) (0.225) (0.296)  (0.194) (0.296) (0.347) 
N 53 53 53  54 54 54 
R2 0.247 0.263 0.262  0.291 0.293 0.292 
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Panel I LSLO       
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons -4.110 1.800 2.234  -1.045 4.706 4.569 
 (0.489) (0.501) (0.436)  (0.898) (0.197) (0.243) 
leverage -0.845 -0.819 -0.823  -0.935 -0.903 -0.900 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
paym -0.956 -0.055 -0.128  -4.353 -3.501 -3.396 
 (0.627) (0.976) (0.943)  (0.115) (0.169) (0.178) 
diff_ind -0.470 -0.249 -0.294  -1.256 -0.949 -0.907 
 (0.795) (0.890) (0.871)  (0.607) (0.695) (0.708) 
soe_dummy -1.615 -1.093 -1.058  0.056 0.309 0.335 
 (0.511) (0.660) (0.668)  (0.986) (0.924) (0.917) 
roa 0.175 0.177 0.171  0.163 0.182 0.184 
 (0.131) (0.136) (0.154)  (0.313) (0.270) (0.268) 
logasset 2.025    2.399   
 (0.330)    (0.406)   
salary  -0.523    0.741  
  (0.778)    (0.770)  
slogasset   -2.646    2.349 
   (0.646)    (0.766) 
ownership -469.477 -464.190 -489.033  -777.350 -670.967 -668.508 
 (0.554) (0.567) (0.546)  (0.484) (0.552) (0.554) 
N 54 54 54  55 55 55 
R2 0.246 0.232 0.234  0.225 0.214 0.215 









  70 
Table 7 Cross-sectional regression analysis of the CARs for SOE/Non-SOE groups 
 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions of the CARs using three 
models for the SOE and Non-SOE subsample. The dependent variable is CARs over (-1, 
0) and (-1, +1), regressed against executive compensation and ownership, controlling a 
variety of firm- and deal- specific variables including leverage, firm size, ROA, method 
of payment and relatedness of bidders and targets. We report the results of CARs for the 
SOE group in Panel A; the results of CARs for the Non-SOE group in Panel B. 
 
Panel A SOE 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 1.808 -1.397 -1.053  13.213 -1.409 -0.909 
 (0.758) (0.698) (0.770)  (0.042) (0.731) (0.823) 
leverage -2.694 -3.053 -3.155  -3.187 -4.131 -4.321 
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.018) (0.003) (0.002) 
paym 4.225 4.961 5.100  8.254 7.754 8.038 
 (0.082) (0.029) (0.026)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
diff_ind 3.620 4.070 4.033  6.061 4.854 4.912 
 (0.212) (0.126) (0.128)  (0.053) (0.104) (0.098) 
roa 0.031 0.018 0.013  0.013 0.009 0.000 
 (0.839) (0.898) (0.925)  (0.939) (0.958) (1.000) 
logasset -1.043    -4.970   
 (0.488)    (0.006)   
salary  -0.279    -0.509  
  (0.064)    (0.007)  
slogasset   -1.527    -2.813 
   (0.061)    (0.006) 
ownership 0.908 21.389 46.074  -113.231 -30.920 18.368 
 (0.995) (0.885) (0.757)  (0.517) (0.859) (0.916) 
N 29 29 29  29 29 29 
R2 0.402 0.479 0.481  0.573 0.566 0.574 
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.336 0.339  0.461 0.453 0.462 
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Panel B NON-SOE 
Variable CAR(-1,0)  CAR(-1,1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
_cons 4.341 6.935 7.032  9.956 8.954 9.004 
 (0.257) 0.000 0.000  (0.023) 0.000 0.000 
leverage -0.224 -0.147 -0.154  -0.361 -0.362 -0.377 
 (0.387) (0.548) (0.529)  (0.220) (0.195) (0.176) 
paym -5.722 -5.524 -5.522  -7.241 -7.105 -7.135 
 0.000       
diff_ind -1.661 -1.541 -1.544  -2.010 -1.931 -1.957 
 (0.154) (0.186) (0.185)  (0.129) (0.144) (0.139) 
roa 0.096 0.123 0.123  0.125 0.136 0.132 
 (0.183) (0.080) (0.079)  (0.128) (0.089) (0.097) 
logasset 0.762    -0.455   
 (0.509)    (0.727)   
salary  -0.175    -0.292  
  (0.471)    (0.288)  
slogasset   -0.760    -1.024 
   (0.441)    (0.361) 
ownership -0.040 -0.049 -0.047  -0.054 -0.053 -0.050 
 (0.348) (0.239) (0.254)  (0.267) (0.263) (0.289) 
N 181 181 181  181 181 181 
R2 0.119 0.119 0.120  0.155 0.159 0.158 
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Figure 1 cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
 
This graph shows the CAARs of acquiring firms over a period from 42 days prior to and 
126 days after M&A announcements. We estimate the abnormal returns of acquiring 
firms based on the market model with a 253 trading day estimation period from day -380  
to day -127  prior to M&A announcements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
